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COMMENT
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PARTY POLITICS
WALLACE MENDELSON*

It has been suggested that intrusion upon legislative policy by
judicial review "is a consequence of that fragmentation of political
power which is normal in the United States. No cohesive majority,
such as normally exists in Britain, would permit a politically irresponsible judiciary to usurp decision-making [policy] functions, but, for
complex social and institutional reasons, there are few issues in the
United States on which cohesive majorities exist."1 When they do
exist, as in the recent tidal wave of anti-communism, the Supreme
Court is not apt to test its strength against them. Rather it practices
a judicious self-restraint. 2
Distinguishing between parliamentary and popular majorities, another commentator finds support in Australian experience for this
view of the relation between judicial and political policy-making.
Australian courts have been able to override their national legislature,
it is said, because they have had the support of cohesive popular majorities. Conversely, we are told, judicial review does not exist in
Britain because there, in contrast to Australia, monolithic legislative
majorities reflect solid popular majorities.3
No doubt, as these comments suggest, judges like the rest of us are
sensitive to public opinion. A more adequate explanation of policymaking via judicial review in the United States and Australia (and its.
absence in Britain) may lie in the special character of their respective
political party systems. Could it be that "judicial supremacy" and
irresponsible political parties are related phenomena? This at least
seems clear: court intrusion upon national policy has thrived in the
United States only in periods of unusual weakness in our party system.
To explore this thought is the purpose of the present essay.
*Professor of Government, The University of Texas.
1. Roche, JudicialSelf-Restraint, 49 Am . POL. Sci. REV. 762, 771 (1955).

2. Id., passim. To date no act of Congress dealing with the communist
menace has been held unconstitutional. With the decline of McCarthyism,
however, the Court seems to have become bolder in guarding civil liberty via
procedural devices that do not require constitutional commitments. See Mc-

Closkey, The Supreme Court Finds a Role: Civil Liberties in the 1955 Term,

42 VA. L. REV. 735 (1956). Of course, the Court does not risk so much when.
it turns a decision on non-constitutional grounds. Such decisions may be readily "reversed" by the political branches of government.
3. Vile, Judicial Review and Politics in Australia, 51 Amv. POL. Sci. REv. 386.
(1957).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 12

Our classic age of judicial legislation on a national scale came between the Civil War and 1937. It arose with the decline of sectional
politics and ended with the advent of what Arthur Holcombe calls
"the new" urban politics. 4 In short, judicial supremacy vis-a-vis national policy seems to have prospered only in a transitional interlude
between two dynamic political party systems. That this is not mere
coincidence is indicated by the fate of judicial pretension before and
after the period in question. Thus the checkmating of incursions upon
national policy by the Marshall and Taney Courts while sectionalism
reigned is matched only by the humiliation of the "nine old men" who
challenged the vigorous new urban politics of our day.
Frederick Turner and his followers have shown how in the early
days shifting alignments of Northeast, West and South, each with a
distinctive economy and culture, provided the key to national policy.
As Turner put it:
We in America are in reality a federation of sections rather than of states.
State sovereignty never was influential except as a constitutional shield for
the section. In political matters the states act in groups rather than as
individual members of the Union. They act in sections and are responsive
to the respective interests and ideals of the sections. They have their
sectional leaders, who, in Congress and party conventions, voice the attitude of the section and confer and compromise their differences, or form
sectional combinations to achieve a national policy and position.5
Between the Constitutional Convention and the Civil War four major
sectional combinations successively came into being. Then, indeed,
brokerage in regional interests was the nub of American statesmanship. An alliance of the agrarian West and South under Jefferson's
leadership in 1800 replaced the Federalist combination of commercial
Northeast and planter South. Revitalized in 1828 by the Jacksonians,
this Democratic coalition dominated politics until slavery made such
an alignment untenable. Then the West turned to the Northeast to
form the modern Republican Party-a most tenacious alliance as
Professor MacMahon has suggested, because its cold economic bargains were cemented with the sentimentality of brotherhood in arms.
But no sooner had Northeast and West accomplished their immediate purpose (defeat of the "slave power") than economic tension
threatened to tear them apart. The Granger, Greenback, Alliance,
Populist and Free Silver movements, were an open manifestation
of a long and persistent agrarian rebellion largely within the reigning
Republican coalition. When before the Civil War the major elements
in a political bloc fell out, sectional realignment was promptly accomplished. Discordant tensions were neutralized and mounting pressures
4. HOLCOMB, TnE NEW
5. TURNER,

THE

PARTY POLITICS (1933).

SIGNIFICANCE OF SECTIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY

50 (1932).
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were relieved in a series of shifting sectional accommodations. The
end result was national policy. Resort to the judiciary for the solution
of national policy problems was superfluous and, when attempted, was
immediately suppressed by violent political reaction. But the Civil
War and its aftermath destroyed the vitality of sectional politics. The
accord which the Republicans effected at Chicago in 1860 was the last
of the great sectional realignments. This may be a clue to the peculiar
success of judicial supremacy vis-a-vis Congress in the years that
followed.
Plainly the rigidity of post-bellum sectionalism springs from the
Civil War itself. Even the churches, despite protestations of brotherly
love, remained divided regional bodies. The agrarian South and West
had formerly supported each other in national politics. After the war
each had its grievances against the "money power" of the Northeast.
If the South were readmitted to the Union, Southern and Western men
would inevitably unite their strength and arrange a national policy which
would serve their [agrarian] interests. Andrew Johnson, in spite of his
loud talk during the early months of his presidency, represented the
promise and guarantee of such a combination. Hence the bitter struggle
to impeach him. Industrial men succeeded by a campaign of hatred both
in defeating Johnson and in holding the South out of the Union for a
decade. Meanwhile, industrialism made its position secure. 6
Thaddeus Stevens saw the problem quite plainly in economic terms.
As he put it in the House of Representatives in January, 1876,
I am now confining my argument to Negro sufferage in the rebel states.
... The white Union [i.e., Republican] men are in a great minority in each
of those states. With them the blacks would act in a body . . .the two
united would form a majority.... It would assure the ascendency of the
Union Party.... If impartial sufferage is excluded in the rebel states then
everyone of them is sure to send a solid rebel representative delegation to
Congress, and to cast a solid rebel electoral vote. They with their kindred
Copperheads of the North would always elect the President and control
Congress.... Now you must divide them between loyalists, without regard
to color, and disloyalists, or you will be perpetual vassels of the free-trade,
irritated, revengeful South. (Emphasis added.)
Unlike those who had actually done the fighting, General Sherman
observed, politicians were ready to "prolong the war ad infinitum."
Commenting upon the Greenback "heresy," Hayes wrote Blaine in
1876 that the Republican Party's "strong ground is the dread of the
Solid South, rebel rule, etc., etc. I hope you will make these topics
prominent in your speeches. It leads the people away from 'hard
times' which is our deadliest foe." Garfield approved this advice as
"sound strategy. ' 7 As late as 1884 a wit supposed that the Republicans
6. DODD, WOODROW WILsoN AND His WoRK 61 (1932).
7. SHERMAN & SHERMAN, SHERMAN LETTERS 248 (1894).

See also CALDWELL,
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"might wring one more president from the folds of that battle-stained
garment," the bloody shirt. Significantly every successful Republican
candidate for the presidency from Appomattox to Manila Bay was
both a westerner and a former "hero" of the Union Army. The GOP
had won a lasting hold on the affections of the North because for many
it seemed to have been the instrument of Providence in preserving the
nation in a time of crisis.8
In short, extraneous sentiments blocked the free play of geoeconomic forces and, by impairing the resilience of sectional politics,
crippled it as the effective arbiter of national policy. The South had
been neutralized politically by an emotional barrier that defied
economic expediency. Western agriculture was wedded incompatibly
to Northeastern business in a union which neither could dominate by
mere political devices.9 Their differences, i.e., national policy, had to
be settled at another level. Here was an entree for judicial mediation
on a grand scale. The judges simply filled a political vacuum that resulted from the ossification of sectional politics.
In the seventy-two years preceding the Civil War only two acts of
Congress suffered judicial veto. There can be no doubt that just as the
"rich and well-born" Federalists disliked democracy, they also shunned
popular political parties (factions) and plainly contemplated judicial
review to protect their special interests from popular legislation. Apparently they anticipated the present thesis as to the relation between
popular government, political parties and judicial review. In any case
when the Federalists lost political control of the nation and sought to
make good that loss through a carefully packed Supreme Court, they
encountered capable political opposition, particularly the Chase Impeachment. As J. Q. Adams observed:
was unquestionably
[T]he [Jeffersonian] assault upon Judge Chase ....
intended to pave the way for another prosecution, which would have swept
the Supreme Judicial Bench clean at a stroke.10
Plainly moved by this response to Marbury v. Madison "the great
Chief Justice" wrote a strange and doubtless tongue-in-cheek apologia:
JAMES A. GARFIELD: PARTY CHIEFTON 249 (1931); HAMILTON, BIOGRAPHY OF
JAMES G. BLAINE 422 (1895).
8. SCHLISINGER, NEW VIEWPOINTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 273 (1934).

9. This Republican "combination, though strong enough to win the Presidency, did not possess the strength needed to control Congress under normal
conditions. Hence, the frantic efforts of the Republican leaders, first to extend
their power into the South by means of Negro votes and later to strengthen
themselves in the West by the admission of new states and the cultivation of
Western interests .... But Populism ruined Republican hopes in the West as
the failure of Negro suffrage ruined them in the South. .. ." Holcombe, Present

Day Characteristics of American Political Parties, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL
SCENE 19 (1938).

10. 3 FORD, THE WRITINGS

OF JOHN

QuINcY ADAMS 106-08 (1914).
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I think the modern doctrine of impeachment should yield to an appellate
jurisdiction in the legislature. A reversal of those legal opinions deemed
unsound by the legislature would certainly better comport with the
mildness of our character than [would] a removal of the Judge who has
rendered them unknowing of his fault.11
Never thereafter, though he was to be on the bench for another thirty
years, did Marshall, or any member of his Court, ever challenge another act of Congress. 12 Marbury v. Madison was born before its
proper day; a sport doomed to languish until new political conditions
generations later offered a more congenial environment. The Jeffersonian combine of South and West was too potent to be defeated from
the bench by the old-guard Federalists. Significantly the latter resorted after the Chase affair not to judicial review, but to the Hartford
Convention which by its resolutions confirmed J. Q. Adams' observation that "the alarm and disgust of the New England Federalists at Mr.
Jefferson's anti-judiciary doctrines and measures ... were one of the
efficient causes which led to the project of separation and a Northern
13
Confederacy.'
Not until the Dred Scott case in 1857 did the Supreme Court again
venture to assert its supremacy over the national political processes.
The repercussions of that fiasco again indicate that relationship between a vigorous political system and judicial review. TheDemocratic
Party had dominated national policy since 1800 and "slavocracy" had
come to control the Democratic Party. Their latest victories had been
the Fugitive Slave Law, the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the tariff reform
11. 3 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 177 (1916).
12. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803), involved a congressional
measure which Marshall and his associates privately thought unconstitutional,
"but they had not the courage [after Marbury v. Madison] to adopt the heroic
course." BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra at 122. The validity of national legislation
was questioned by counsel in Marshall's Court on at least fourteen occasions
after Marbury v. Madison. The apparent futility of such efforts no doubt discouraged others, e.g., United States v. The William, 28 Fed. Cas. 614 (No.
16700) (D. Mass. 1808). Of course, Marshall's Court did invalidate several
state laws, much to the annoyance of the Jeffersonians. But invalidation of a
state measure is not apt to precipitate national political reaction on a scale
comparable to that involved by judicial intrusions upon national policy. It
was one thing, for example, for the Federalist Court to strike down such narrowly local policies as those involved in Dartmouth College v. Woodard, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), and Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87
(1810). It doubtless would have been something very different-or so Marshall
apparently felt-for the Court to have vetoed the crucial national policy involved in Stuart v. Laird. To put the matter differently: it would have been
extremely difficult for the Jeffersonians to make a national political issue out
of the management of Dartmouth College, or Georgia's unusual problem in the
Yazoo land transaction-or the highly popular decision in Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). On'the other hand Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 419 (1793), and the resulting constitutional amendment suggests that
the Court may not with impunity strike down local interests which have intense political support in all or many states.
13. See Letter to the Citizens of the United States in 1829, ADAMS, DocuMENTS RELATING TO NEw ENGLAND FEDERALISM 162 (1905).
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of 1857. But in Dred Scott they overreached themselves. Abraham
Lincoln exploited that blunder in the famous debates with Douglas.
At Freeport he forced from his opponent the fatal doctrine that tore
the South from the West and broke the Democratic Party. Promptly
thereafter a realignment of sectional forces brought Northeast and
West together in a winning combination that carried Lincoln to the
White House and overrode the Dred Scott decision. Once again resilient sectionalism had frustrated a judicial venture into the national
policy preserve.
In contrast to its two thwarted assertions of supremacy in the
seventy-two years before the Civil War, the Court struck down seventy-six congressional measures and emasculated others in a like
period (1865-1937) thereafter. But cold statistics hardly tell the story.
After its first coup the Court had not seen fit to strike again for more
than fifty years. Its second coup brought ugly repercussions which
few thought the Court could ever out-live. Yet in a decade beginning
only eight years after the Dred Scott catastrophe the Justices vetoed
not less than eight acts of Congress. Significantly the principal issues
that came before the high Court after 1865 involved clashes of interest
between major partners in the dominant political alliance-businessman, grain farmer and laborer. As Wilfred Binkley demonstrates,
Lincoln's Republican Party had been an agrarian-labor alliance, but
the adoption of it in Grant's day by powerful Eastern capitalist interests gave it incongruous economic-sectional wings. 14 Because of the
bloody shirt this incongruity was resolved not by sectional realignment as in 1800, 1828 and 1860, but by intra-party litigation. Judicial
review replaced sectional politics as the prime arbiter of national
policy.
In spite of the Court's condemnation of the theory that "parties have an
appeal from the legislature to the courts," powerful interests from the
time of the Civil War were encouraged by the trend of decisions to carry
to the Supreme Court all cases lost in Congress, and the power of judicial
review came more and more to resemble a political veto. But there was
opposition within the Court itself to being cast in the role of censor. Led
by the brilliant and forceful [Mr. Justice] Miller, it resisted for a few
years the ceaseless pressure of creditors, bondholders, railroads, and
coupon-clippers. The first ominous rumble of what lay in the future was
heard in the famous Legal Tender Cases.15
For a time it was touch and go. If business interests prevailed via
judicial supremacy in the first round of the paper money controversy,
14.

BINKLEY,

AMERICAN
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(1943). Compare the capture of the Democratic Party by the slave-owners in
earlier days.
15. JACKSON,

THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

41 (1941).
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agrarianism as reflected in congressional policy won in the second. 16
But by the mid-nineties the Court, and through it "business," had
achieved a dominant position. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,
the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Income Tax Act of 1894 had all
germinated on the western plains. They were the produce of a long
agrarian political struggle against the excesses of the American industrial revolution. What had taken years to achieve the Court destroyed
in a matter of months. The income tax was invalidated.' 7 The antitrust act and the railroad legislation were emasculated. 18 Simultaneously "government by injunction" sprang up to keep labor "in its
place."' 19 In short, carefully exploited emotions of the Civil War and
Reconstruction went far to sustain an uneasy alliance between agrarian West and industrial Northeast, while judicial review insured the
20
supremacy of business interests within that "dominant" combination.
That the Supreme Court had achieved a new role in American
government was not unnoticed by astute contemporary observers. As
President Hadley of Yale saw it in 1908,
the fundamental division of powers in the Constitution of the United
States is between the voters on the one hand and property owners on the
other. The forces of democrary on the one side, divided between the
executive and the legislature, are set over against the forces of property
on the other side with the judiciary as arbiter between them.=
To make good its new role the Court needed new tools. Thus the interregnum between our two political party systems was perhaps the most
"creative" era in the development of American constitutional law.
Due process acquired a substantive economic content.22 Liberty of
contract and laissez faire became the law of the land.23 The labor injunction was invented. 24 The concept of property was expanded by the
myth of "fair value. '25 New meaning for an antiquarian constitutional
phrase gutted hopes for fiscal reform.2 6 What Holmes called an "invisible radiation" (dual federalism) was discovered in the tenth
amendment: a radiation which somehow restricted even expressly
16. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869); Legal Tender Cases,
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
17. Pollack v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
18. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Texas Pacific Ry. v.
ICC, 162 U.S. 184 (1896); ICC v. Texas Pacific Ry., 167 U.S. 479 (1897).
19. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
20. See note 9 supra.
21. 64 THE INDEPENDENT 837 (1908).
22. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
course, was crippled by the same device.

State power, of

23. Ibid.

24. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).

25. For a history of the rise and fall of the "fair value myth" see Hale,

Utility Regulation in the Light of the Hope Natural Gas Case, 44 COLUM. L.
REV. 488 (1944).

26. Pollack v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
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delegated national powers. 27 But these new vehicles of policy-to be
used or ignored in the Court's discretion-were the creatures of their
age. Not one of them survived the political vacuum in which they were
born!
Meanwhile, endless agricultural depression aggravated the difficulty of the tenuous Republican coalition. Plainly a new sectional
alliance was struggling to be born. Hamlin Garland pointed out that
"As ten cent corn and ten percent interest were troubling Kansas, so
six cent cotton was inflaming Georgia." Mrs. Lease, exhorting farmers
to "raise less corn and more hell," declared that "the West and South
are prostrate before the manufacturing East." In a great sectional
upheaval "the Gracchus of the West," William Jennings Bryan, sought
to rally the forces of discontent under the delusively simple emblem of
Free Silver. He would use the Debs and the Income Tax cases, as
Lincoln had used Dred Scott. The silver issue struck at the very jugular of the "money power" and exposed the deep fissures that divided
the awkward Republican sectional coalition. Obviously if Bryan's
assault upon judicial supremacy should succeed as had those of
Jefferson, Jackson2 and Lincoln, the special immunities that business
had won at the bar against income taxes, anti-trust laws, railroad
regulation and labor unions would be jeopardized. But unlike its
predecessors in 1800, 1828 and 1860, the revolt of 1896 failed. For the
first time in American history the embattled western farmer suffered
political defeat. Against him Mark Hanna had deployed the "money
power" in the most expensive campaign the nation had ever seen.
Bryanism, according to Governor Altgeld of Illinois, was "confronted
by all the banks, all the trusts, all the syndicates, all the corporations,
all the great papers-by everything that money could buy... ."29 But
this and a capricious rise in the price of wheat just prior to the election
(thanks to crop failures abroad) did not solve the problems that confronted the American people. Some day the embarrassing issues that
Bryan had forced into national politics would have to be faced.
A few weeks after the election, Theodore Roosevelt observed that
Bryanism was still a "real and ugly danger and our hold upon the
forces that won the victory for us [is] by no means too well assured." 30
27 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
28. President Jackson successfully vetoed the bank measure on constitutional
grounds, inter alia, notwithstanding McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819), which had sustained the constitutional validity of such
legislation. The veto message also expressly repudiated the principle of judicial supremacy. It was with respect to Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832), that President Jackson is said to have remarked, "Marshall has
made his decision, now let him enforce it." Whatever Jackson said, in fact the
judgment was not enforced.
29. BROWNE, ALTGELD OF ILLiNoIs 296 (1924).
30. MILLS, THE MARTIAL SPIRIT 58-59 (1931).
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The bloody shirt had lost its political efficacy. Could new distractions
be found lest South and West see their common interest and unite?
By chance or design the decrepit position of the Republicans was
bolstered by what Secretary of State Hay called "the splendid little
war with Spain." After that Imperialism, 31 World War I and "back to
32
normalcy" helped postpone the evil day.
Having reached a high plateau of power in 1895, the Supreme Court
fought for the most part a consolidating action until the mid-1930's.
Only in the destruction of labor legislation perhaps did it extend its
position.
By 1933 Attorney General (later Mr. Justice) Jackson observed, the Court
was no longer regarded as one of three equal departments among which
the powers of government were distributed. Instead, [it was said to be]
invested with acknowledged and supreme authority, and the whole con-

servative and property philosophy became oriented around "judicial
supremacy."

33

A premonition of things to come appeared in the Senate's 1930 refusal
to confirm the appointment of Judge John Parker to the Supreme
Court. His offense had been a faithful adherence as lower court magistrate to the "anti-labor" doctrines of the highest court of the land!
The difficulty was that industrialization had transformed America
into a nation of city dwellers and thereby laid the foundation for "new
party politics." 34 Labor had replaced the farmer in the nightmares of
businessmen. Industry, throttled by the institutions of a pre-industrial
economy of scarcity, could not distribute the plentiful products of
an "affluent society." Bewildered old-guard observers called it "overproduction." "The Common Man" faced starvation in the midst of
plenty. These new horizontal fissures in American life were replacing
the old vertical tensions of sectionalism as the nub of national politics.
Only the catalyzing magic of an effective political leader was wanting.
When the national economy collapsed Franklin Roosevelt succeeded
where Bryan had failed. As Samuel Lubell explained,
The really revolutionary surge behind the New Deal lay in this coupling
of the depression with the rise of a new generation, which had been malnourished on the congestion of our cities and the abuses of industrialism.
Roosevelt did not start this revolt of the city. What he did do was to
awaken the climbing urban masses to a consciousness of the power in their
numbers .... In turn, the big-city masses furnished the votes which re-

elected Roosevelt again and again-and, in the process, ended the traditional Republican [sectional] majority in this country. .

.

. In the past

31. BRYAN & BRYAN, THE 1MEMIoRs OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN 125 (1925).

32. Meanwhile the pressure was somewhat relieved by Roosevelt's "Square

Deal," Wilson's "New Freedom," the Progressive Movement and the "farm
bloc"--all reaping where Bryan had tilled.
33. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 72 (1941).
34. HOLCOMBE, THE NEW PARTY POLITICS (1933).
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American political realignments have always followed sectional lines.
The Revolt of the City, however, has drawn the same class-conscious line
of economic interest across the entire country, overriding not only regional
distinctions but equally strong cultural differences.3 5
Mr. Hoover was not the first chief executive to lose office via economic
depression. But surely no one before F.D.R. had attained the presidency through an election in which functional (as distinct from geographic) cleavage was as clear as it was in 1936 when 61 per cent of
the white-collar, 67 per cent of the skilled, 74 per cent of the semiskilled, and 80 per cent of all organized, workers supported him as did
60 per cent of the middle, and 76 per cent of the lower, income groups.36
Could judicial review continue to dominate national policy? With
boldness reminiscent of its counter-revolution in the 1890's the Supreme Court struck down virtually the entire New Deal recovery
program. Indeed, it went so far that Mr. Justice Cardozo is said to have
remarked, "We are no longer a Court." But what judges had achieved
under petrified sectionalism, they could not maintain in the face of a
vigorous urban politics. Like the great statesman of the old politics
of sections (Jefferson, Jackson and Lincoln), the first master of urbanism had his way with the Court. The "Packing Plan" of 1937, like
the Chase Impeachment of 1805, failed only in its immediate aspects.
The Supreme Court began at once a long and extended retreat from
which it has not yet rallied.
If it be urged that six acts of Congress have been struck down since
1936, one answer is that this in itself is something of a post-bellum
record.3 7 In a corresponding twenty-two year period prior to 1937, for
example, thirty national measures had been invalidated. But a mere
count of cases does not reveal the extent of the Court's new selfrestraint. Pre-1937 judicial vetoes cover the whole broad spectrum of
national economic and social policy. The half-dozen post-1936 vetoes
are confined to one specialized field-where legislation jeopardizes the
right to a fair trial. Surely here courts may be deemed to have some
special competence vis-a-vis Congress. What meaning is there in the
separation of powers, if that principle does not justify judicial review
for the protection of the judicial process itself?
In perspective then, American experience suggests that the success
of judicial review of national policy varies in close inverse relation to
35. LUBELL, THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 29, 50 (1951).
36. BINKLEY, AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR NATURAL HISTORY 380-82
(1943).
37. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957);
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174
(1952); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Tot v. United States, 319
U.S. 463 (1943).
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the efficacy of the political party system.38 Or to put it differently,
judicial "legislation" apparently feeds on defects in the political
structure. If, as some insist, public opinion is important in the judicial
process, it seems even more important when implemented by dynamic
and responsive party machinery. The Supreme Court's only power
is its power to persuade. Purse and sword are in other hands. But
judicial persuasiveness multiplies when political opposition is lacking
or disorganized. On the surface at least, Australian experience with
judicial review seems to teach the same lesson and by contrast so does
that of Great Britain.39
38. As to judicial review of state policy, see footnote 12 supra.
39. For a history of the subjugation of the Supreme Court of the Union of
South Africa by powerful political forces, see Livingston, Court and Parliament In South Africa, 10 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 434 (1957).

